Posts Tagged ‘Recession’

Will ECRI's Call for Recession Prove Accurate?

Sunday, May 13th, 2012

ECRI's Lak­sh­man Achuthan was mak­ing the rounds yes­ter­day, with yet another defense of his firm's reces­sion call – the first claim which came early last fall.  I do think (from mem­ory) he has pushed out the time frame a bit from when the ini­tial call came, but since early this year has claimed we will see it by mid year.  Per­haps the very warm win­ter hurt the call as well – who knows with these black boxes.  Below we have a video with CNBC and there is one nugget in there I did not know.  Con­ven­tional wis­dom is a reces­sion is back to back quar­ters of neg­a­tive GDP… but accord­ing to the NBER (and Achuthan) that is but one of a group of poten­tial signals.

The Com­mit­tee does not have a fixed def­i­n­i­tion of eco­nomic activ­ity. It exam­ines and com­pares the behav­ior of var­i­ous mea­sures of broad activ­ity: real GDP mea­sured on the prod­uct and income sides, economy-wide employ­ment, and real income. The Com­mit­tee also may con­sider indi­ca­tors that do not cover the entire econ­omy, such as real sales and the Fed­eral Reserve's index of indus­trial pro­duc­tion (IP).

10 minute video – email read­ers will need to come to site to view


Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Markets | Comments Off


ECRI Repeats Recession Call Based on Coincident Indicators, Especially Income

Sunday, May 13th, 2012

Once again Eco­nomic Cycle Research Institute's Lak­sh­man Achuthan repeats his reces­sion call, this time say­ing within three months.

His call is based on coin­ci­dent indi­ca­tors, espe­cially income. Accord­ing to Achuthan, income growth in the last three months is lower than at the start of any of the last 10 recessions.

Link if video does not play: Why U.S. Econ­omy is Head­ing Back Into Recession

Once again I tend to agree with him, yet once again I find some things that sound rather disingenuous.

When asked "Can the Fed­eral Reserve do any­thing about this?", Achuthan responded "no".

Specif­i­cally Achuthan replied "It's so ironic. We're all free-marketeers. .... the free mar­ket has indige­nous inher­ent busi­ness cycles which means ups and downs. It's ironic that we think that the Fed or other poli­cies could just stave off a reces­sion".

I agree. How­ever, the state­ment rep­re­sents one hell of an atti­tude change as the fol­low­ing flash­backs show.

Win­dow of Opportunity

Fri­day, Jan­u­ary 25, 2008
ECRI Says There Is A Win­dow of Oppor­tu­nity for the US Economy

The U.S. econ­omy is now in a clear win­dow of vul­ner­a­bil­ity, given the plunge in ECRI’s Weekly Lead­ing Index (WLI) since last spring. Yet there is a brief win­dow of oppor­tu­nity within that win­dow of vul­ner­a­bil­ity to avert a reces­sion. That is why ECRI has not yet fore­cast a recession. ....

This is why, hav­ing cor­rectly pre­dicted the last two reces­sions in real time with­out cry­ing wolf in between, we are not fore­cast­ing one yet.

ECRI Denial

The ECRI laid it on pretty thick, openly mock­ing the "best adver­tised [reces­sion] in his­tory" while claim­ing "This is why, hav­ing cor­rectly pre­dicted the last two reces­sions in real time with­out cry­ing wolf in between, we are not fore­cast­ing one yet."

The irony is the reces­sion was about 2 months old at the time.

Reces­sion of Choice

Fri­day, March 28, 2008
ECRI Calls it "A Reces­sion of Choice"

The U.S. econ­omy is now on a reces­sion track. Yet this is a reces­sion that could have been averted. In Jan­u­ary, given the plunge in the Weekly Lead­ing Index, we declared that the econ­omy had entered a clear win­dow of vul­ner­a­bil­ity. Yet we empha­sized the brief win­dow of oppor­tu­nity within that win­dow of vul­ner­a­bil­ity for timely pol­icy stim­u­lus to head off a recession.

It is a some­what dif­fer­ent story with regard to GDP, because the cycli­cally volatile man­u­fac­tur­ing sec­tor still accounts for 36% of GDP. A mild down­turn in that sec­tor should limit the decline in GDP in this recession.

Ques­tion for Achuthan

If it was a reces­sion of choice in 2008 (after the reces­sion already started), why isn't it a ques­tion of choice now? Of course, it is entirely pos­si­ble Achuthan has changed his mind about what is or isn't possible.

Then again, is that change of heart a new fun­da­men­tal belief or sim­ply a nec­es­sary state­ment because his call is now reces­sion as opposed to no reces­sion in late 2007 and early 2008 (while later tak­ing credit for pre­dict­ing a recession).

It is not my intent to keep bring­ing this dis­crep­ancy up, but Achuthan has come out with yet another rea­son for his call that is dra­mat­i­cally dif­fer­ent that what the ECRI has stated before.

The key point how­ever is the fore­cast, and on that score I side with Achuthan. I also side with Achuthan that he Fed can­not do much to stave off reces­sions. His­tory will show who is correct.

Mike "Mish" Shedlock

http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Markets | Comments Off


Earnings Growth—Is It Enough? (Ezrati)

Monday, May 7th, 2012

 

by Mil­ton Ezrati, Lord Abbett

After two-plus years of exceed­ing expec­ta­tions, earn­ings this year seem poised, at last, to reflect the plod­ding nature of this eco­nomic recov­ery. In 2010 and 2011, even as the real econ­omy man­aged only a pal­try 2.4% aver­age annual rate of expan­sion, the earn­ings of S&P 500® Index1com­pa­nies soared, ris­ing more than 47% in 2010 and almost 20% in 2011. Such a pat­tern could not per­sist. And this year, the slow fun­da­men­tals will almost surely assert them­selves. Even so, it would be a mis­take to read mat­ters too pes­simisti­cally. There cer­tainly is noth­ing omi­nous in the pat­tern. It is, after all, well-established his­tor­i­cally that earn­ings should come into line with slower-growing rev­enues in this, the third year of eco­nomic recov­ery. Besides, this year’s prob­a­ble 10% earn­ings growth, though only about half 2011’s pace, is suf­fi­cient to sus­tain the stock mar­ket rally.

This unfold­ing pat­tern of surge and mod­er­a­tion is hardly sur­pris­ing or new. It has, in fact, become a cycli­cal com­mon­place, a reflec­tion of the increas­ingly huge oper­at­ing lever­age of Amer­i­can busi­ness. Every year, busi­ness relies more and more on machin­ery, facil­i­ties, sys­tems, and other forms of tech­nol­ogy, often in place of labor. Because the trend builds a larger pro­por­tion of fixed costs into the pro­duc­tion model, even slight vari­a­tions in rev­enues have an exag­ger­ated impact on the bot­tom line. In the more dis­tant past, when vari­able labor costs were a big­ger part of the over­all pro­duc­tion equa­tion, lay­offs could reduce a sig­nif­i­cant part of over­all costs and so relieve some of the strain on the bot­tom line in reces­sions, and then, when rehir­ing raised labor costs in recov­ery, the prof­its recov­ery was more muted. But oper­at­ing lever­age has intro­duced a more volatile pattern.

The dra­matic effect was clear dur­ing the last reces­sion and in this recov­ery so far. In 2008-09, when the real econ­omy dropped 5.1% peak to trough over 18 months, rev­enues fol­lowed, but because busi­nesses had lit­tle abil­ity to cut costs, the full brunt of the down­turn fell on earn­ings, which, for the S&P 500, plunged from almost $22 a share in the sec­ond quar­ter of 2007 to a loss of more than $25 at the end of 2008. But how­ever much strain the oper­at­ing lever­age imposed in the reces­sion, it has worked in business’s favor in this recov­ery. As this huge array of pro­duc­tive cap­i­tal has come back on line, the fixed costs allowed vir­tu­ally all the addi­tional rev­enue to fall to the bot­tom line. And because prof­its are a small dif­fer­ence between rev­enues and costs, the small per­cent­age rev­enues gain have cre­ated huge per­cent­age changes in prof­its. But now, in this third year of expan­sion, when most of this pro­duc­tive cap­i­tal has at last become more fully uti­lized, the effect of oper­at­ing lever­age should dis­si­pate, forc­ing earn­ings to fol­low slower rev­enues growth more faithfully.

Still, even as 2012 fails to enjoy the remark­able earn­ings surges of 2010 and 2011, the out­look for this year is not entirely as depress­ing as some media reports imply. Earn­ings can still out­pace the 5–6% expected advance in domes­tic rev­enues because there is still some oper­at­ing lever­age left in the sys­tem and because S&P com­pa­nies gather more than half their rev­enues abroad. Europe’s reces­sion, of course, will weigh against for­eign rev­enue growth, but the emerg­ing economies should more than off­set Europe’s depress­ing influ­ence. Though these economies, too, have slowed, and that fact has attracted a lot of atten­tion, they still out­pace the United States and other devel­oped economies by far. China, after slow­ing, still reg­is­ters real growth of more than 8% and India more than 6%. In nom­i­nal terms (which, of course, is the way rev­enues are mea­sured), those economies should still con­tribute double-digit growth of their part of the 2012 S&P rev­enues equa­tion. Adding to likely 7–8% over­all rev­enues gains, the remains of oper­at­ing lever­age should bring S&P earn­ings up to about 10% in 2012.

That growth, though half last year’s pace, should nonethe­less allow equity mar­kets to hold the gains they have already made and likely rise fur­ther. Even after mar­ket gains of the last six months, val­u­a­tion mea­sures are far from stretched. Price-to-earnings mul­ti­ples, after all, depend­ing on which of the seem­ingly end­less cal­cu­la­tions one chooses, show a mar­ket that at worst is near its his­tor­i­cal val­u­a­tion bench­mark, allow­ing it room to keep up with earn­ings at least. Since, in most other respects, val­u­a­tions are still more attrac­tive, equity price advances should exceed the earn­ings growth. Stocks, rel­a­tive to Trea­sury bonds, offer val­u­a­tions not seen since the early 1950s or even the Great Depres­sion. Next to cor­po­rate bond yields, equity val­u­a­tions look less dra­matic, but still sug­gest con­sid­er­able upside poten­tial. It is note­wor­thy that, even today, div­i­dend yields on many stocks atyp­i­cally exceed the yields on the firm’s own bonds.

Since earn­ings, though slow­ing, are still show­ing sub­stan­tive growth, the most con­ser­v­a­tive inter­pre­ta­tion of val­u­a­tions would sug­gest that equi­ties should hold this year’s gains so far. Any­thing other than the most con­ser­v­a­tive inter­pre­ta­tion sug­gests greater gains.

1The S&P 500® Index is widely regarded as the stan­dard for mea­sur­ing large cap U.S. stock mar­ket per­for­mance and includes a rep­re­sen­ta­tive sam­ple of lead­ing com­pa­nies in lead­ing industries.

The opin­ions in the pre­ced­ing com­men­tary are as of the date of pub­li­ca­tion and sub­ject to change based on sub­se­quent devel­op­ments and may not reflect the views of the firm as a whole. This mate­r­ial is not intended to be legal or tax advice and is not to be relied upon as a fore­cast, or research or invest­ment advice regard­ing a par­tic­u­lar invest­ment or the mar­kets in gen­eral, nor is it intended to pre­dict or depict per­for­mance of any invest­ment. Investors should not assume that invest­ments in the secu­ri­ties and/or sec­tors described were or will be prof­itable. This doc­u­ment is pre­pared based on infor­ma­tion Lord Abbett deems reli­able; how­ever, Lord Abbett does not war­rant the accu­racy or com­plete­ness of the infor­ma­tion. Investors should con­sult with a finan­cial advi­sor prior to mak­ing an invest­ment decision.

Investors should care­fully con­sider the invest­ment objec­tives, risks, charges, and expenses of the Lord Abbett funds. This and other impor­tant infor­ma­tion is con­tained in each fund’s sum­mary prospec­tus and/or prospec­tus. To obtain a prospec­tus or sum­mary prospec­tus on any Lord Abbett mutual fund, con­tact your invest­ment pro­fes­sional or Lord Abbett Dis­trib­u­tor LLC at 888–522-2388 or visit us at www.lordabbett.com. Read the prospec­tus care­fully before you invest.

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Markets | Comments Off


Commodities Back in Bear Territory (Bespoke)

Monday, May 7th, 2012

With Europe mired in reces­sion and eco­nomic data in the US turn­ing soft in recent weeks, the com­modi­ties sec­tor has taken it on the chin recently.  With a decline of close to 2% today, the CRB Com­modi­ties index is once again down more than 20% from its highs in 2011.

Tags: , , , , , ,
Posted in Markets | Comments Off


PIMCO's Bill Gross – No QE3 Right Away, but a Few Weak Employment Reports Brings It

Monday, April 30th, 2012

PIMCO's Bill Gross has a wide rang­ing inter­view on Bloomberg dis­cussing all sorts of top­ics from more QE, the Fed fol­low­ing the Bank of England's plan to ignore any infla­tion as 'tem­po­rary' so they can con­tinue ultra easy poli­cies, the dys­func­tion in Europe, the poten­tial for reces­sion, among other topics.

9 minute video – email read­ers will need to come to site to view

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Markets | Comments Off


The Economy and Bond Market Radar (April 30, 2012)

Sunday, April 29th, 2012

The Econ­omy and Bond Mar­ket Radar (April 30, 2012)

Trea­suries were more or less unchanged for the sec­ond week in a row. U.S. eco­nomic data offered a mixed bag and the Fed essen­tially stayed the course with regard to mon­e­tary pol­icy. First quar­ter GDP was released on Fri­day and the econ­omy grew 2.2 per­cent, mod­estly below esti­mates. The key take­away from the report is that the econ­omy is not strong enough for the Fed to seri­ously con­sider shift­ing pol­icy but it is weak enough to keep the pos­si­bil­ity of addi­tional QE or other stim­u­la­tive mea­sures alive.

US Read GDP

Strengths

  • The hous­ing mar­ket con­tin­ues to show signs of life as new home sales and pend­ing home sales trend higher. In addi­tion, months of sup­ply of new homes has fallen to 5.3 months, back to 2006 levels.
  • The HSBC China flash PMI index improved to 49.1, still indi­cat­ing con­trac­tion but mov­ing in the right direc­tion and ris­ing for the fourth month in a row.
  • With the econ­omy still show­ing tepid growth, the Fed will remain accommodating.

Weak­nesses

  • The U.K. econ­omy con­tracted by 0.2 per­cent in the first quar­ter and is now tech­ni­cally back in recession.
  • Weekly ini­tial job­less claims remain ele­vated at 388,000 this week, con­tin­u­ing the recent trend of higher readings.
  • Con­sumer con­fi­dence indi­ca­tors ticked lower in April even as gaso­line prices fell.

Oppor­tu­nity

  • After a dis­ap­point­ing first quar­ter GDP result, the Chi­nese are likely to ease mon­e­tary pol­icy as soon as this quarter.

Threat

  • Ris­ing oil and gaso­line prices com­bined with liq­uid­ity impli­ca­tions of global eas­ing, led by Europe, may raise the prospect of a reap­pear­ance of higher infla­tion going forward.

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Markets | Comments Off


Don't Like the Real Data? Just Pretend!

Thursday, April 26th, 2012

 

by Jeff Miller, Dash of Insight

If you are reach­ing an impor­tant invest­ment deci­sion, I have a sug­ges­tion for you:

Insist on data — accept noth­ing less!

Investors should mon­i­tor diverse sources of invest­ment infor­ma­tion to avoid con­fir­ma­tion bias.  If you want to suc­ceed, you still need to engage in crit­i­cal think­ing.  Some are in com­plete denial about progress.  There is a sim­ple solu­tion if you do not like the real­ity of strong cor­po­rate earnings:

Talk about "nor­mal­ized earnings."

This has a won­der­ful sci­en­tific feel to it, lend­ing an air of cred­i­bil­ity to those who have not stud­ied the sub­ject.  After all, don't we want our esti­mates to be "normal?"

If the cur­rent strong earn­ings reports do not fit your fore­cast, you can just say that you want to "nor­mal­ize" earn­ings with­out offer­ing any clue about your method or how it has worked in the past.

Back­ground

When the reces­sion hit, there were many observers who felt that even the finest com­pa­nies would be crushed by the eco­nomic col­lapse.  They expected that rev­enues would fall, expenses would increase, and profit mar­gins would collapse.

Some of us thought that the best com­pa­nies — not all — would learn to get "lean and mean" and would increase earn­ings rapidly dur­ing the rebound.  We were right, and we have prof­ited from this investment.

The increased earn­ings had a down­side, since it often came at the expense of work­force reduc­tions, with remain­ing work­ers asked to do more.

The Recov­ery

Dur­ing the recov­ery period, the com­pa­nies with enhanced pro­duc­tiv­ity have blos­somed — bet­ter earn­ings and bet­ter cash flows.  There is a clear lesson:

Profit mar­gins went higher as pric­ing power and employ­ment went lower.

I dis­agree with some observers (some­times accused of being perma-bulls) who think that profit mar­gins have achieved a per­ma­nently higher level.  My own con­clu­sions are more nuanced.  I fully expect profit mar­gins to decline, and I am inter­ested in two questions:

  1. When?
  2. How far?

We should all be open-minded about the even­tual profit mar­gin level, which is a func­tion of (pri­mar­ily) new com­pet­i­tive entrants. When it comes to a topic like — for exam­ple — unem­ploy­ment — the bear­ish pun­dits are eager to embrace the idea that there have been struc­tural changes.  OK — and what about the many com­pa­nies that are pro­tect­ing their profit margins?

More impor­tantly, I agree with the gen­eral con­cept that profit mar­gins will decline.  At the same time this "mean rever­sion" occurs I expect  all of the things we asso­ciate with a strong recov­ery:   Bet­ter employ­ment, bet­ter pric­ing power, and more aggres­sive com­pe­ti­tion from new companies.

There is noth­ing sur­pris­ing about any of this, since it reflects a typ­i­cal busi­ness cycle.

Time to call "FOUL!"

There is a group that I'll call Pun­dits in Denial.  They engage in sta­tic analy­sis, expect­ing profit mar­gins to decline while noth­ing else changes.  As a result of this mis­guided analy­sis they help to scare the day­lights out of the aver­age investor by stat­ing that if earn­ings were "nor­mal­ized"  —what a won­der­ful word!!  — then the mar­ket is mas­sively overvalued.

How to Normalize

When I am ana­lyz­ing a stock with cycli­cal prop­er­ties, I def­i­nitely con­sider the earn­ings at peaks and troughs of the busi­ness cycle.  This is one of the key ele­ments of my edge, so most peo­ple have no idea about how to do this.  If you are at a busi­ness cycle trough, you must be will­ing to buy cycli­cal stocks at a high P/E mul­ti­ple  — and vice versa.

To do this cor­rectly you need to have a good the­ory of the busi­ness cycle and where we are right now.

You can­not just take a meat cleaver to earn­ings, say­ing that you reject the data because of profit margins.

Invest­ment Conclusion

If you want to gain an invest­ment edge you have to find some­thing that most peo­ple are doing wrong.  Invest­ing in cycli­cal stocks com­bines com­mon errors on profit mar­gins, eco­nomic strength, and where we are in the busi­ness cycle.

I have a cur­rent empha­sis on this theme, but today presents an out­stand­ing can­di­date in Cater­pil­lar (CAT). I had sev­eral stocks in mind for this arti­cle, but CAT is the most timely.  I am choos­ing it as the worst-performing (and there­fore the best oppor­tu­nity) of stock fit­ting this theme, since the stock sold off today despite a good report.  Here is the long-term earn­ings pic­ture (from the excel­lent fast­graphs source) before today's report:

CAT

Any investor who looks at this chart for a minute or so will be far ahead of most of the peo­ple they see in TV!  You can see for your­self the worst case of earn­ings dur­ing reces­sions, the gen­eral growth rate, the abil­ity of the com­pany to deal with reces­sions, and the cur­rent potential.

Noth­ing in today's report upset this story, so you get a chance to buy a ter­rific stock at a discount.

Once again, I abbre­vi­ated this story to cite the stock with the best cur­rent oppor­tu­nity.  Another can­di­date to fea­ture in this story was Apple, but that would have been a layup!  I hope read­ers under­stand that there are many, many stocks like this.

To repeat the main point — "nor­mal­iz­ing" prof­its is not as obvi­ous as it first seems.....

More to come.

 

Copy­right © Dash of Insight

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Markets | Comments Off


The Intersection of Bonds and Equities

Tuesday, April 24th, 2012

 

by Guy Lerner, The Tech­ni­cal Take

Fig­ure 1 shows a weekly chart of the SP500. In the lower panel is an ana­logue chart of our bond trad­ing model. This bond model has been bull­ish for 3 weeks now.

Fig­ure 1. SP500 v. Bond Model/ weekly

Note how the bond model turned bull­ish back on March 26, 2010 and on March 11, 2011. Not only did these sig­nals coin­cide (more or less) with an equity mar­ket top, but these time peri­ods also sig­naled the end of active mon­e­tary inter­ven­tion by the Fed­eral Reserve. This was the end of QE1 and QE2, respec­tively. Now we have the lat­est incar­na­tion of QE end­ing — Oper­a­tion Twist. Inter­est­ingly enough, the equity mar­ket appears to be top­ping out once again as the bond model has turned positive.

So why is the bond model pos­i­tive? Despite the low yields, bonds could be viewed as a safe haven from a frag­ile macro envi­ron­ment. While this may be true to some extent, I believe the equity weak­ness or bond strength (in this case) is a reflec­tion and early sign of eco­nomic weak­ness. In par­tic­u­lar, the 2011 mar­ket top coin­cided with notice­able dete­ri­o­ra­tion in the eco­nomic data that was clearly point­ing towards reces­sion. Of course, the Fed came to the res­cue with Oper­a­tion Twist and the “dreaded” reces­sion was avoided.

So in sum­mary, a top­ping equity mar­ket appears to be a sign of an econ­omy that has peaked as well. This has been her­alded by strength in bonds. Most likely, this is sig­nal­ing fur­ther quan­ti­ta­tive eas­ing as the Fed­eral Reserve inter­venes in the bond mar­ket to prop up the econ­omy and the equity markets.

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Markets | Comments Off


Europe has its Parti Québécois Moment (Tchir)

Monday, April 23rd, 2012

 

by Peter Tchir, TF Mar­ket Advisors

I have said and writ­ten that I expect to see more nation­al­ism come into play as the cri­sis con­tin­ues. I may have been a bit early, but we are see­ing grow­ing signs of it, with Marine le Pen’s strong show­ing in yesterday’s French elec­tion being the most obvi­ous exam­ple. The Dutch Parliament’s fail­ure to approve “aus­ter­ity” is another sign of grow­ing skep­ti­cism of a one size fits all Euro solution.

In Canada, the Parti Québé­cois always did bet­ter in tough eco­nomic times. When times are good, peo­ple like to hang out, talk about vaca­tions, what they bought, which was the best Habs team of all time, and why the cur­rent ver­sion of Les Cana­di­ens is under­achiev­ing. In tough times, peo­ple are eager to hear why the prob­lems are some­one else’s fault. Good times are always a direct result of one’s own actions; whereas, bad times tend to be blamed on some­one or some­thing else. Now they can talk a bit about how things would be bet­ter if those someone’s or something’s would change, before mov­ing on to the best Habs player of all time, and what the cur­rent team should change to be like the old teams.

Away from the elec­tion results, more eco­nomic data came out of Europe, and it is all bad. PMI missed. Spain is clearly in a reces­sion. Bank stocks are get­ting ham­mered. The S&P futures are sit­ting just above 1,360. We tested the 1,358 level last week and had a strong bounce. The week before saw one sell-off get as low as 1,355 before bounc­ing. I think the com­bi­na­tion of weak data, strange votes, and the real­iza­tion that the fire­wall has no imme­di­ate impact will weigh on the mar­ket and we will break through and trade below 1,350 before we see another round of support.

AAPL is def­i­nitely a wild­card. It is the cheap­est it has been in 40 days. Yes, that is the prob­lem. The sell-off has been dra­matic, but after a par­a­bolic move higher, we are only back to prices last seen on March 14th. It was at $455 on Feb­ru­ary 1st. I will be watch­ing this closely as it is so big in the indices that it could be the cat­a­lyst for a bounce, or the trig­ger for a big­ger sell-off towards the 100 day mov­ing average.

CDS indices are weak across the board. In Europe, MAIN is at 148.5, 5 wider on the day, and bid/offer spread is increas­ing as liq­uid­ity evap­o­rates again. IG18 is rel­a­tively strong, only 2 bps wider at 102, but with fair value being at least 105, there is some room for this index to move wider. I think Europe was just scared to push futures below that 1,360 sup­port, and if we break that this morn­ing, IG can quickly move to 104 bid. If HYG or JNK opens any­where within a ¼ or pos­si­bly a ½ point of Friday’s close, it is a good sale, as they are over­bought, trad­ing at a pre­mium to NAV, and this lat­est round of weak­ness in Europe will put pres­sure on all the credit markets.

French bond yields are actu­ally a lit­tle bet­ter on the day (some­what sur­pris­ing to me given the elec­tion results, but I guess they still cap­ture some “flight to qual­ity” bid, but they are not as strong as Ger­man bunds. Ital­ian and Span­ish 10 year bonds are both weak, hit­ting yields of 5.71% (+6 bps) and 5.96% (+3 bps) respec­tively. They have bounced off the lows, but I think we will see a capit­u­la­tion move lower with Italy get­ting to 6.25% and Spain to 6.5% before any seri­ous ECB inter­ven­tion occurs.

Buy the dip has worked well, almost too well, so I am not going to do that. I believe we break this sup­port level and see one more sig­nif­i­cant down­ward move before we see real sup­port in any of the risk markets.

Copy­right © TF Mar­ket Advisors

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Markets | Comments Off


Dr. Copper, the Economics Ph.D.

Wednesday, April 18th, 2012

It is often stated that cop­per is the metal with a Ph.D. in eco­nom­ics, and the data for the most part bears this out.

Fig­ure 1 is a monthly chart of cop­per (cash data) with NBER dated reces­sions noted by the indi­ca­tor in the lower panel.  With the indi­ca­tor in the down posi­tion, the US econ­omy is in reces­sion; when the indi­ca­tor is up, the US econ­omy is expand­ing.  As can be appre­ci­ated, cop­per does bet­ter dur­ing eco­nomic expan­sions.  The metal typ­i­cally peaks dur­ing reces­sions before head­ing into a down trend (see ver­ti­cal gray bars).

Fig­ure 1. Cop­per v. NBER recessions/ monthly

Presently, cop­per is under per­form­ing the broader mar­ket, and as we can see from the weekly chart (see fig­ure 2, cash data), cop­per gap below its 40 week mov­ing aver­age last week, and it is mak­ing a lower high.  The weak­ness in cop­per should be respected, but there is more to the story.

Fig­ure 2. Copper/ weekly

The next graph (fig­ure 3) is a weekly chart of cop­per (cash data).  In the lower panel, is the “Bull­ish Con­sen­sus” data  for cop­per from Mar­ket­Vane.  Accord­ing to the Mar­ket­Vane web­site, “the Bull­ish Con­sen­sus mea­sures the futures mar­ket sen­ti­ment each day by fol­low­ing the trad­ing rec­om­men­da­tions of lead­ing Com­mod­ity Trad­ing Advi­sors.”  Many investors view the Mar­ket­Vane data (and sen­ti­ment data in gen­eral) as help­ful in iden­ti­fy­ing mar­ket turn­ing points.  For the most part, this is true as we have seen many times how too many investors on one side of a trade often leads to a strong reac­tion in the oppo­site direc­tion.  But sen­tient data also has other uses that few rarely speak of, and this has to do with trend fol­low­ing.  In essence, as prices of an asset rise so does the degree of bull­ish­ness, and as prices fall, investors become more bear­ish.  So what good is fol­low­ing investor sen­ti­ment if it just tracks price?  My research shows that investor sen­ti­ment leads price by about a week or two, so investor sen­ti­ment is a good tool at iden­ti­fy­ing changes in a trend that do not occur at the extremes.  Let me give some examples.

Fig­ure 3. Cop­per v. Mar­ket­Vane Bull­ish Consensus/ weekly

Fig­ure 4 shows how investor sen­ti­ment leads price.  Once again, this is a weekly chart of cop­per (cash data) with the Bull­ish Con­sen­sus for cop­per in the lower panel.  The black dots rep­re­sent swing pivot points.  Now if we look at the cur­rent Bull­ish Con­sen­sus value and com­pare this value to past swing pivot points, we can make the state­ment that a close below three swing pivot points is bear­ish.  As you can see, this was the the case in 2006 and in 2008.  (This also hap­pens to be the case across time and other asset classes.)  When the Bull­ish Con­sen­sus value closed below 3 prior swing pivot points, cop­per dropped rather pre­cip­i­tously.  (As an aside, I am draw­ing upon my research with pivot points, and I have pre­vi­ously pre­sented sim­i­lar find­ings in a SP500 trend fol­low­ing strat­egy; click HERE to go to that arti­cle.)  So a close below 3 pivot points is gen­er­ally bear­ish, and since sen­ti­ment tracks price and as sen­ti­ment often pre­cedes price in time, this is an omi­nous sign.

Fig­ure 4. Copper/ weekly

Now let’s move our chart for­ward in time and look at the past 2 years.  See fig­ure 5.  At point #1, the Bull­ish Con­sen­sus value closed below 3 swing pivot points.  Rather than sell off, this marked the low point for cop­per before it reversed strongly higher.  8 weeks later, Fed­eral Reserve Chair­man Bernanke men­tioned QE2 at his speech at Jack­son Hole.  At point #2, this break­down nearly marked the high point for cop­per back in April, 2011.  Point #3 was the break down back in Sep­tem­ber, 2011.  Rather than lead to a break down in price, this also marked a bot­tom.  This also hap­pened to coin­cide with the Fed­eral Reserve’s Oper­a­tion Twist and with the Euro­pean Cen­tral Bank’s LTRO.  Lastly, turn your atten­tion to the “?????”.  The Bull­ish Con­sen­sus has closed below 3 swing pivot points.  While this nor­mally would be inter­preted bear­ishly, one could eas­ily spec­u­late, based upon the recent past, that cen­tral bank inter­ven­tion is imminent.

Fig­ure 5. Copper/ weekly

So what have we learned from Dr. Cop­per today?

One.  Cop­per gen­er­ally peaks dur­ing recessions.

Two.  Cop­per is cur­rently putting in a lower high and is trad­ing below its 40 week mov­ing aver­age; cop­per peaked over 1 year ago.

Three.  Investor sen­ti­ment not only tracks price but it often pre­cedes it by a cou­ple of weeks.  The cur­rent price struc­ture for the Bull­ish Con­sen­sus is bearish.

Four.  Recent bear­ish pat­terns in the price struc­ture of the Bull­ish Con­sen­sus have been bull­ish owing to cen­tral bank inter­ven­tion.  In essence, cen­tral banks have pre­vented a reces­sion from unfolding.

Five.  It should noted that each cen­tral bank inter­ven­tion has pro­vided less and less ben­e­fit to the mar­kets.  When look­ing at cop­per, we see that Oper­a­tion Twist did not pro­duce gains that were seen dur­ing QE2.  It’s as though the mar­kets have become resis­tant to the effects of mon­e­tary stimulation.

Lastly and most impor­tantly.  What’s next for cop­per and the mar­kets?  The break­down in the price struc­ture of the Bull­ish Con­sen­sus for cop­per strongly sug­gests lower prices for cop­per, which in all like­li­hood implies a reces­sion.  Cen­tral bankers have been timely in their imple­men­ta­tion of recent quan­ti­ta­tive eas­ing, and we could eas­ily make the case that their inter­ven­tions have thwarted the onset of a reces­sion on more than one occa­sion.  Cop­per will need to reverse from the cur­rent lev­els and investors will need to embrace that risk.  This will be her­alded by a rever­sal in the Bull­ish Con­sen­sus.  Will cen­tral bankers be able to save the day again?

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Markets | Comments Off


Gary Shilling Still Looking for a Recession in 2012 Part I

Wednesday, April 11th, 2012

Gary Shilling has been more dour than most on the under­ly­ing econ­omy the past 3–4 years, and that could be argued was a rel­a­tively good call.  Despite never before seen lev­els of fed­eral gov­ern­ment and cen­tral bank inter­ven­tion, the econ­omy con­tin­ues to limp along at what I call a "meh" pace.  Nor­mal recov­er­ies sans mas­sive inter­ven­tion should have had some sus­tained peri­ods of 4–5%+ type GDP growth; we're happy with 2–3% nowa­days.  Gary's long U.S. Trea­suries call has been against the grain, and mostly right the past few years, and he's had quite a few other pre­scient calls as well.  Shilling posted 2 arti­cles on Bloomberg, stat­ing the case for a reces­sion in 2012 – which is now again an out­lier view.  We'll look at part 1 today, and look at part 2 which focuses on the labor mar­ket tomorrow.

Here are some of his views as he looks at the main pil­lars of the economy:

  • For sev­eral months, I’ve been fore­cast­ing a reces­sion in the U.S. this year, argu­ing that weak­ened con­sumer spend­ing – the key to the eco­nomic out­look — would tip the econ­omy back into a down­turn.  But what about recent pos­i­tive data and markets? Do they affect my forecast?
  • Con­sumers Are the Linch­pin: The U.S. econ­omy is being fueled these days by strong con­sumer spend­ing, which increased in Feb­ru­ary by 0.8 per­cent, its best show­ing in seven months, after ris­ing 0.4 per­cent in Jan­u­ary. Retail sales rose 1.1 per­cent in Feb­ru­ary — the fastest pace in five months — while same-store sales advanced 4.7 per­cent. These num­bers cor­re­late with recent gains in con­sumer con­fi­dence and sentiment.
  • I don’t see this pace con­tin­u­ing. Personal-income growth con­tin­ues to be weak — up just 0.2 per­cent in Feb­ru­ary — mean­ing this recent exu­ber­ant con­sumer spend­ing is being fueled largely by increased debt and tap­ping of savings.
  • At the same time, pay per employee is ris­ing slowly and con­tin­ues to fall in real terms. So increased job growth remains the key to any increases in real house­hold after-tax income, which declined in Feb­ru­ary for a sec­ond straight month and gained a mere 0.3 per­cent, com­pared with Feb­ru­ary 2011.
  • Spend­ing, Sav­ing and Debt: The sup­port that con­sumer spend­ing has received from less sav­ing and more debt appears tem­po­rary. House­hold debt – includ­ing mortgages,student loans, and auto and credit-card loans — has fallen rel­a­tive to dis­pos­able per­sonal income, though. In my analy­sis, this is largely because of write-offs of trou­bled mort­gages. Nev­er­the­less, revolv­ing con­sumer credit, mostly on credit cards, is no longer being liquidated.
  • Non-revolving con­sumer credit con­tin­ues to rise in response to grow­ing sales of vehi­cles — most of which are financed — and in stu­dent loans, as the poor job mar­ket keeps stu­dents in school or sends them back. Tuition increases encour­age more bor­row­ing, while inter­est costs on past-due loans mount.  [Mar 8, 2012: What Drove Yesterday's Surge in Con­sumer Credit? Mas­sive Upswing in Fed­eral Stu­dent Loans]
  • It would seem, then, that con­trary to my stead­fast belief that con­sumers are being forced to save more and reduce debt to rebuild net worth, they have been doing the oppo­site lately.
  • Con­sumer Retrench­ment: The data so far aren’t con­clu­sive, but evi­dence of U.S. con­sumer retrench­ment is emerg­ing. Con­sumer con­fi­dence has moved up recently but remains far below the lev­els of early 2007 before the col­lapse in sub­prime mort­gages set off the Great Recession. Real per­sonal con­sump­tion expen­di­tures growth has been volatile in recent months and falling on a year-on-year basis. Voluntary depar­tures from jobs, another mea­sure of con­fi­dence, may be decreasing. And con­sumer spend­ing will no doubt have a big slide if my fore­cast of another 20 per­cent drop in house prices pans out. (Mark's note: that seems aggressive!)
  • Hous­ing activ­ity remains depressed, with the only signs of life com­ing from the mul­ti­fam­ily com­po­nent, which is being dri­ven by the appetite for rental apart­ments as home­own­er­ship declines.
  • What Oil Threat?: Recently, there has been great con­cern about $4 per gal­lon gaso­line and whether, as in 2008, those high prices will act as a tax on con­sumer incomes and force dras­tic cut­backs in other pur­chases.  These con­cerns are overblown. Amer­i­can con­sumers have reacted to ris­ing gaso­line prices as you would expect in tough times: by con­sum­ing less. Demand (DOEDMGAS) in the mid-February to mid– March four-week period was down 7.8 per­cent from a year ear­lier, mainly due to more effi­cient vehicles.
  • As a result, the recent surge in gaso­line prices has had a rel­a­tively small impact on con­sumer pur­chas­ing power. The $14.8 bil­lion increase from Octo­ber 2011 to March 2012, com­pared with the year-earlier period, amounts to about 0.3 per­cent of con­sumer spending.

Con­clu­sion:

  • Con­sumer spend­ing is the only major source of strength in the U.S. econ­omy this year. State and local-government spend­ing remains depressed because of deficit woes and under­funded pen­sion plans. Housing suf­fers from excess inven­to­ries and may face a fur­ther 20 per­cent drop in prices. Excess capac­ity restrains cap­i­tal spending. Recent inven­tory build­ing appears involuntary. So con­sumer retrench­ment will tip the bal­ance toward a mod­er­ate and over­due recession.

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Markets | Comments Off


The Outlook for Earnings (Brown)

Tuesday, April 10th, 2012

 

by Dr. Scott Brown, Ph. D, Chief Econ­o­mist, Ray­mond James

April 9 – April 13, 2012

The stock mar­ket has risen nicely this year, partly on improv­ing eco­nomic data, but are such gains jus­ti­fied by the earn­ings out­look? The level of the S&P 500 Index does not appear to be out of line with earn­ings expec­ta­tions, but there may be some pres­sure on prof­its over the longer term. As the elec­tion approaches, we may hear more about class warfare.

In the late 1990s, share prices rose more than was jus­ti­fied by the earn­ings out­look. In hind­sight, the mar­ket was clearly in a bub­ble. In the last decade, the mar­ket rose roughly in line with earn­ings. How­ever, the Great Reces­sion sent earn­ings sharply lower, and the stock mar­ket fol­lowed. Since the reces­sion has ended, earn­ings have more than recov­ered. Bottom-up earn­ings esti­mates for more than a year out, com­piled from ana­lysts’ fore­casts of indi­vid­ual com­pa­nies, still look a bit giddy, but that’s typ­i­cal. Top-down esti­mates, pro­vided by econ­o­mists and strate­gists, are more mod­er­ate – and con­sis­tent with some slow­ing in cor­po­rate earn­ings rel­a­tive to the last few years. That’s to be expected. Much of the rebound in earn­ings has reflected the bounce-back from the reces­sion. Firms have a ten­dency to cut too many jobs and overly cur­tail cap­i­tal expen­di­tures near the end of the down­turn and there’s some catch-up as con­di­tions begin to improve.


Click here to enlarge

Part of the strength in cor­po­rate prof­its in the recov­ery has been due to the restraint in labor costs. Given the large amount of slack in the labor mar­ket, wage pres­sures are rel­a­tively sub­dued. More­over, since the labor mar­ket slack is expected to remain ele­vated for some time, cor­po­rate prof­its are likely to stay rel­a­tively strong. As a per­cent­age of national income, cor­po­rate prof­its are very high and labor com­pen­sa­tion is rel­a­tively low. The share of national income going to prof­its and the share going to labor cycles back and forth over time and at some point the pen­du­lum seems likely to swing back in the other direc­tion, but prob­a­bly not any­time soon.


Click here to enlarge

It’s hard to have an intel­li­gent dis­cus­sion about the dis­tri­b­u­tion of income. One side sites “cor­po­rate greed,” the other sites “class envy.” For the most part, econ­o­mists have gen­er­ally shied away from income dis­tri­b­u­tion issues. This is mostly a ques­tion of pol­i­tics. It’s dif­fi­cult to say what an “appro­pri­ate” dis­tri­b­u­tion of income should be and what steps should be taken to achieve it.

How­ever, there’s no doubt­ing that the dis­tri­b­u­tion of income has widened sig­nif­i­cantly over the last thirty years. Real wages have stag­nated. A lot of that is due to the decline of union mem­ber­ship. In the early 1970s, 25% of private-sector jobs were union jobs. Now unions account for less than less than 7% (note that 37% of public-sector jobs are union, but many of these are teach­ers and the dynam­ics are a lot dif­fer­ent). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, we typ­i­cally had more than 300 work stop­pages per year, involv­ing mil­lions of work­ers. We had 19 last year, involv­ing 113,000 workers.

It’s unclear what role the dis­tri­b­u­tion of income will take in this year’s elec­tion, but investors should pay attention.

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Markets | Comments Off


AdvisorAnalyst.com's Top 20 Stories for March-April 2012

Friday, April 6th, 2012

Here are this month's Top 20 Sto­ries accord­ing to you:

1. Inter­est Rates: The Mar­ket Has it All Wrong (Jakobsen)

2. James Paulsen: Does Gold Still Glitter

3. Sprott: Invest­ment Out­look (April 2012)

4. Jef­frey Saut: How to Posi­tion Port­fo­lios for 2012

5. Twelve Steps to Mak­ing Your Busi­ness Fun Again

6. "This Time its Dif­fer­ent?" — David Rosen­berg Explains the Melt Up and the Latent Risks

7. Ray Dalio: Ugly = Beau­ti­ful / Beau­ti­ful = Ugly

8. Defin­ing Risk: War­ren Buffett's Three Kind of Investments

9. Why War­ren Buf­fett is Wrong About Gold (Koesterich)

10. Bill Gross: Invest­ment Out­look (April 2012)

11. A Sim­ple Method to Improve Your Client's Invest­ment Performance

12. A False Sense of Secu­rity (Hussman)

13. David Rosen­berg: The Record Quarter

14. John Huss­man: Invest­ment Out­look (March 19, 2012)

15. A Warn­ing From War­ren Buffett's Top Eco­nomic Indicator

16. Doug Kass Says The Mar­ket is Now Overvalued

17. ECRI: Why Our Reces­sion Call Stands

18. Are Record ECB Mar­gin Calls Impair­ing Gold

19. Fig­ur­ing Out ECRI's Reces­sion Call

20. Shift­ing Winds, Tur­bu­lence Ahead (Sonders)

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Brazil, Markets | Comments Off


Buy Commodities, Sell Brands (Smead)

Wednesday, March 28th, 2012

 

by William Smead, Smead Cap­i­tal Management

We saw War­ren Buf­fett quoted the other day say­ing, “We like com­pa­nies which buy a com­mod­ity and sell a brand”. We thought it would be very help­ful to unpack his thought and put it into the con­text of today’s cir­cum­stances. We at Smead Cap­i­tal Man­age­ment believe these cur­rent cir­cum­stances are framed by the his­tor­i­cal over-pricing of com­modi­ties, the com­ing eco­nomic con­trac­tion of China, the suc­cess­ful cleans­ing of the income state­ments of US house­holds and the inevitable rebound in hous­ing in the US. We will look at the makeup of our port­fo­lio com­pa­nies which buy a com­mod­ity and sell a brand to con­sider their upside poten­tial in this inter­est­ing environment.

When non-economic investors load up on invest­ments in any­thing which has had a big run up, please cir­cle the wag­ons. When com­modi­ties were at their low point in 1999, it was hard to find any insti­tu­tional investor or finan­cial advi­sor rec­om­mend­ing expo­sure in com­modi­ties for investors. As of the end of 2010, insti­tu­tions are ded­i­cat­ing as much as 52% of their port­fo­lio to alter­na­tive invest­ments. This includes com­modi­ties, gold and energy. These invest­ments are made today for diver­si­fi­ca­tion pur­poses and are sim­ply bets on ris­ing prices. These bets look good in a rearview mir­ror as we’ve had a once in a gen­er­a­tion move into this asset class. We believe that com­modi­ties have never been more over-priced in the US and are enter­ing a decade-long bear market.

We believe the rea­son com­modi­ties have been in a bull mar­ket for so long is the unin­ter­rupted eco­nomic boom in China. When a coun­try with 1.3 bil­lion peo­ple grows at over 10% for a num­ber of years with­out an occa­sional reces­sion, it ends up rely­ing on fixed asset invest­ments for growth. When fixed asset invest­ments dom­i­nate your GDP num­bers, bor­rowed money pre­pares to turn sour and ulti­mately lead to a recession/depression. This is some­thing that “get­ting rid of cable” can’t cure.

The Fed­eral Reserve came out with their house­hold debt ser­vice ratio (HDSR) last week. It shows that by the end of 2011, Amer­i­can house­holds had brought the ratio down below 11% to 10.88%. This matches up with the lev­els seen in the early 1980’s reces­sion and the “ane­mic” eco­nomic recov­ery of 1990–93. These ear­lier read­ings pre­ceded two of the best mod­ern eco­nomic growth peri­ods since World War II. While the doom­say­ers moan about absolute debt lev­els, we feel they are miss­ing the story on the health of the income state­ment of the aver­age house­hold. This has boded well for the econ­omy his­tor­i­cally. Also, if we con­tinue to be slow to buy houses and cars, this HDSR could put dis­cre­tionary spend­ing into its most favor­able posi­tion in decades.

Lastly, this cur­rent “ane­mic” eco­nomic recov­ery has been severely retarded by the boom com­mod­ity prices of the last two years, in our opin­ion. We’ve had to work off a huge num­ber of fore­closed and short-sale hous­ing inven­to­ries, while the deep reces­sion tem­porar­ily crip­pled house­hold for­ma­tion (Jeff, Who lives at Home). It is rebound­ing as 20-somethings get sick of liv­ing with the par­ents and the par­ents get sick of liv­ing with Jeff. As Mr. Buf­fett said recently, “even­tu­ally hor­mones take over” and as Brett Arends pointed out in Smart Money,” rent­ing is more expen­sive than buy­ing in about 75% of Amer­i­can cities.” You add high lum­ber, cop­per, iron ore and oil prices to this mix and you get the worst depres­sion in hous­ing and blue-collar employ­ment since the depres­sion. All these head­winds are about to become tail­winds, in our vision, over the next five years.

There­fore, bet­ting on the US econ­omy and the US con­sumer looks very favor­able to us, espe­cially where the rebounds in employ­ment and con­sumer con­fi­dence have an impact. In fairy tales, peo­ple are asked to spin straw into gold. We like to own com­pa­nies which spin milk and cof­fee (SBUX), cot­ton (JWN and CAB), inter­net access (EBAY and ACN), tax returns (HRB) and chem­i­cals (MRK, AMGN, BMY, ABT, PFE and MYL) into gold. Profit mar­gins on commodity-related com­pa­nies and com­pa­nies reliant on emerg­ing mar­ket growth could plum­met in the near future. Just ask the folks at BHP Bil­li­ton. They announced March 20th, 2012 that they are see­ing in a big drop off in demand from China. In turn, we believe mar­gins could go up for any­one who is pos­i­tively impacted by lower energy prices and/or com­mod­ity prices in gen­eral. This is espe­cially true if you “buy com­modi­ties and sell brands”.

Best Wishes,

William Smead

 

The infor­ma­tion con­tained in this mis­sive rep­re­sents SCM’s opin­ions, and should not be con­strued as per­son­al­ized or indi­vid­u­al­ized invest­ment advice. Past per­for­mance is no guar­an­tee of future results. Some of the secu­ri­ties iden­ti­fied and described in this mis­sive are a sam­ple of issuers being cur­rently rec­om­mended for suit­able clients as of the date of this mis­sive and do not rep­re­sent all of the secu­ri­ties pur­chased or rec­om­mended for our clients. It should not be assumed that invest­ing in these secu­ri­ties was or will be prof­itable. A list of all rec­om­men­da­tions made by Smead Cap­i­tal Man­age­ment with in the past twelve month period is avail­able upon request.

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Markets | Comments Off


Investor Sentiment Remains Elevated

Monday, March 26th, 2012

Cen­tral bankers have done their part flood­ing the world with liq­uid­ity, and investors have caught on as well by tak­ing asset prices higher. Cen­tral bankers have their backs, but there is no rea­son to think that some new vir­tu­ous cycle has been cre­ated.  By lift­ing global mar­kets, cen­tral bankers have averted a reces­sion and cush­ioned any future fall in asset prices.  So what if the SP500 drops 10%?  That would take the SP500 down to its 200 day mov­ing aver­age.  What a buy­ing oppor­tu­nity that would be for the always bull­ish crowd.  So while it may not be a vir­tu­ous cycle, we can say, “mis­sion accom­plished”.  I don’t think the “all clear” is ever war­ranted and just when investors get com­fort­able with one thing, the mar­ket has a way of chang­ing its tune.  Pre­dict­ing when this will hap­pen is dif­fi­cult, but it is more likely to hap­pen in the cur­rent mar­ket envi­ron­ment when bull­ish extremes in investor sen­ti­ment per­sist.  If you are a buyer now, you may not make any money, but that is the risk you take when buy­ing high with the expec­ta­tion to sell higher.  So while cen­tral bankers can claim mis­sion accom­plished, for the aver­age investor it is going to boil down to mar­ket timing.

The “Dumb Money” indi­ca­tor (see fig­ure 1) looks for extremes in the data from 4 dif­fer­ent groups of investors who his­tor­i­cally have been wrong on the mar­ket: 1) Investors Intel­li­gence; 2) Mar­ket­Vane; 3) Amer­i­can Asso­ci­a­tion of Indi­vid­ual Investors; and 4) the put call ratio. This indi­ca­tor shows extreme bull­ish­ness.  As stated last week: “If we look at the “dumb money” indi­ca­tor in fig­ure 1, we know that as long as the indi­ca­tor stays above the upper band (see green arrow on chart), prices should con­tinue to go higher – albeit in a grind­ing fash­ion at this stage of the rally.  This is the syn­drome I call “it takes bulls to make a bull mar­ket”.  If the indi­ca­tor closes below the upper band, then the best time to sell is usu­ally one week after this occur­rence.  In this instance, the mar­ket is rolling over and those late to the party are buy­ing that dip.  The data shows that this is the opti­mal time to sell.  But these are opti­mal sce­nar­ios, and I should cau­tion that opti­mal and stock mar­ket are rarely spo­ken of in the same sen­tence.  The mar­ket is just too unpre­dictable.  Who saw the May, 2010 “flash crash” or the 20% drop over 3 weeks in 2011 com­ing?  If you hang around too long, you could be one of those casu­al­ties.  Alas, there are no right answers or guar­an­tees.  These are just sign­posts that help us bet­ter under­stand the price action.

Fig­ure 1. “Dumb Money”/ weekly

Fig­ure 2 is a weekly chart of the SP500 with the Insid­er­Score “entire mar­ket” value in the lower panel. From the Insid­er­Score weekly report: “Insider sell­ing lev­els con­tin­ued at ele­vated lev­els, how­ever, vol­ume began to dimin­ish as some com­pa­nies began clos­ing trad­ing win­dows ahead of the quiet period strad­dling the end of one quar­ter and the begin­ning of another.”

Fig­ure 2. Insid­er­Score “Entire Mar­ket” value/ weekly

Fig­ure 3 is a weekly chart of the SP500. The indi­ca­tor in the lower panel mea­sures all the assets in the Rydex bull­ish ori­ented equity funds divided by the sum of assets in the bull­ish ori­ented equity funds plus the assets in the bear­ish ori­ented equity funds. When the indi­ca­tor is green, the value is low and there is fear in the mar­ket; this is where mar­ket bot­toms are forged. When the indi­ca­tor is red, there is com­pla­cency in the mar­ket. There are too many bulls and this is when mar­ket advances stall. Cur­rently, the value of the indi­ca­tor is 68.16%. This is the sec­ond week in a row that the indi­ca­tor has turned down week over week. Val­ues less than 50% are asso­ci­ated with mar­ket bot­toms. Val­ues greater than 58% are asso­ci­ated with mar­ket tops. It should be noted that the mar­ket topped out in 2011 with this indi­ca­tor between 70% and 71%.

Fig­ure 3. Rydex Total Bull v. Total Bear/ weekly

Copy­right © The Tech­ni­cal Take

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Markets | Comments Off


Figuring Out ECRI’s Recession Call

Friday, March 23rd, 2012

I am writ­ing this post in response to the arti­cle “Why Our Reces­sion Call Stands” of March 15, 2012 by Lak­sh­man Achuthan and Anir­van Banerji of the Eco­nomic Cycle Research Insti­tute (ECRI).

ECRI said: “How about forward-looking indi­ca­tors? We find that year-over-year growth in ECRI’s Weekly Lead­ing Index (WLI) remains in a cycli­cal down­turn (top line in chart) and, as of early March, is near its worst read­ing since July 2009. Close observers of this index might be under­stand­ably sur­prised by this per­sis­tent weak­ness, since the WLI’s smoothed annu­al­ized growth rate, which is much bet­ter known, has turned decid­edly less neg­a­tive in recent months. The unusual diver­gence between these two mea­sures of growth under­scores a wide­spread sea­sonal adjust­ment prob­lem that econ­o­mists have known about for some time.”

The last sen­tence of the above para­graph must be treated with some cir­cum­spec­tion. What they call “the unusual diver­gence” is in my opin­ion noth­ing but a math­e­mat­i­cal diver­gence. Let me take you through their cal­cu­la­tion of the smoothed annu­al­ized growth rate as I fig­ured it out. ECRI cal­cu­lates a lin­ear smoothed time-weighted index for every week based on weekly WLI val­ues over the past 52 weeks, where each fol­low­ing week car­ries pro­por­tion­ately more weight than the pre­vi­ous week. The weekly per­cent­age change of the time-weighted index is then cal­cu­lated and annu­al­ized. My cal­cu­la­tion of the WLI smoothed annu­al­ized growth rate is vir­tu­ally a per­fect fit of that of ECRI with an r-squared of 0.99.

Sources: ECRI; Plexus Asset Management.

It is there­fore plain logic that the WLI smoothed annu­al­ized growth rate will lead the WLI year-over-year growth rate.

Sources: ECRI; Plexus Asset Management.

It fol­lows that even if the smoothed annu­al­ized growth rate starts to fall in com­ing weeks the year-over-year growth rate will start to turn less negative.

ECRI also com­mented that “In spite of the efforts of mon­e­tary pol­icy mak­ers, actual U.S. eco­nomic growth has slowed, while WLI growth has barely budged from a two-and-a-half-year low.”

In pre­vi­ous calls ECRI empha­sized the smoothed annu­al­ized growth rate of the WLI but its focus has clearly changed to the year-on-year growth rate. Will the improved year-on-year growth rate of the WLI in com­ing weeks change their mind and cause a big hooray about ECRI‘s change in stance or are they hop­ing or wish­ing for a major fall in the mar­kets? It would seem the “unusual diver­gence” ECRI refers to and its change in focus to year-on-year growth from smoothed annu­al­ized growth are used to sub­stan­ti­ate their call on the econ­omy, whether it may turn out to be right or wrong.

ECRI also said “It is notable that the WLI, which is sen­si­tive to the prices of risk assets that have been sup­ported by mas­sive world­wide liq­uid­ity injec­tions, has hardly been swayed from its reces­sion­ary trajectory.”

In ana­lyz­ing the WLI I con­cen­trated on three major assets, namely the S&P 500, US 10-year Gov­ern­ment Bond Yield and the Econ­o­mist Met­als Index. My analy­sis indi­cates that ECRI again focused on year-on-year growth rather than on smoothed annu­al­ized growth rates when they made the statement.

The U.S. stock indices may have a major impact on the cal­cu­la­tion of the WLI. This is evi­dent when the year-on-year growth of the S&P 500 Index is com­pared to that of the WLI. The growth rate of the S&P 500 Index bot­tomed at zero per­cent and is on the rise. This should impact pos­i­tively on the WLI.

Sources: ECRI; I-Net; Plexus Asset Management.

The smoothed annu­al­ized growth rate of the S&P 500 Index is clearly exert­ing upward pres­sure on the smoothed annu­al­ized growth rate of the WLI.

Sources: ECRI; I-Net; Plexus Asset Management.

The prices of mate­ri­als could have a major impact on the WLI and the Econ­o­mist Met­als Index is prob­a­bly a good proxy for the prices of mate­ri­als. The year-on-year growth rate of the Met­als Index is cur­rently impact­ing neg­a­tively on the year-on-year-growth rate of the WLI.

Sources: ECRI; I-Net; Plexus Asset Management.

The smoothed annu­al­ized growth rate of the Econ­o­mist Met­als Index is clearly exert­ing upward pres­sure on the smoothed annu­al­ized growth rate of the WLI.

Sources: ECRI; I-Net; Plexus Asset Management.

The U.S. bond mar­ket could have a major impact on the WLI and the 10-year Gov­ern­ment Bond Yield is prob­a­bly a good proxy for the U.S. bond mar­ket. The year-on-year growth rate of 10-year bond yield index is cur­rently impact­ing neg­a­tively on the year-on-year-growth rate of the WLI.

Sources: ECRI; I-Net; Plexus Asset Management.

The smoothed annu­al­ized growth rate of the 10-year bond yield is clearly exert­ing upward pres­sure on the smoothed annu­al­ized growth rate of the WLI.

Sources: ECRI; I-Net; Plexus Asset Management.

It would seem that the WLI is in fact cur­rently swayed AWAY “… from its reces­sion­ary tra­jec­tory” (ECRI’s quote), espe­cially due to the fact that the smoothed annu­al­ized growth rates lead year-on-year growth rates.

ECRI said: “The unusual diver­gence between these two mea­sures of growth under­scores a wide­spread sea­sonal adjust­ment prob­lem that econ­o­mists have known about for some time.”

I assume the “wide­spread sea­sonal adjust­ment prob­lem” ECRI refers to is the mar­kets’ reac­tion to the sea­sonal adjust­ments that per se influ­ence the WLI. Surely, sim­i­lar pre­vi­ous reac­tions or, put dif­fer­ently, price and yield move­ments due to adjust­ments, have been taken into account in all the data series and were included in ECRI’s pre­vi­ous calls?

I am an invest­ment pro­fes­sional and not an econ­o­mist and regard the WLI and ECRI’s calls on the econ­omy of great value and indis­pens­able. Whether I agree or dis­agree with their cur­rent reces­sion call is not the point, but I urge them to stick to the orig­i­nal inter­pre­ta­tion of their WLI and not to be selec­tive in the inter­pre­ta­tion that may be viewed as jus­ti­fy­ing their view on the econ­omy. After all, mar­kets are extremely well informed and their antic­i­pa­tion of future eco­nomic trends is nearly per­fect, hence the con­struc­tion of ECRI’s WLI and the great value it offers to non-economists.

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Markets | Comments Off


The Second Differential of the ECRI

Monday, March 19th, 2012

Last week the Eco­nomic Cycle Research Insti­tute (ECRI) affirmed their call made last fall that the U.S. econ­omy would soon be in reces­sion.   The ECRI’s main busi­ness focus is to try and pre­dict the ups and downs of the busi­ness cycle, and they have had an out­stand­ing record over the years.  Right now the absolute level of the index may sug­gest eco­nomic weak­ness, but the sec­ond dif­fer­en­tial has sug­gested an improv­ing stock mar­ket is also in the cards.

The ECRI has devel­oped a weekly indi­ca­tor where they have com­bined var­i­ous eco­nomic sta­tis­tics into a series that they pub­lish.  Details are not pro­vided on the spe­cific of the com­po­si­tion of this index, but they include broad mea­sures of out­put, employ­ment, income and sales.  When describ­ing the weekly ECRI index, they always empha­size that these met­rics are based on lead­ing indi­ca­tors rather than coin­ci­dent indi­ca­tors, so their data should carry more weight. No argu­ment here, as we’d agree with this assessment.

In an arti­cle writ­ten last week, they reit­er­ated their call that a U.S. reces­sion is forth­com­ing.  Con­fi­dence in this call was based on the year over year analy­sis of the weekly ECRI index, as it was again sig­nal­ing weak­ness.  Year over year sta­tis­tics help alle­vi­ate sea­son­al­ity in the num­bers, which has been a com­mon com­plaint over recent months.  Again, we are not debat­ing the merit of this argu­ment, as this seems like solid rea­son­ing.   But what we would say, is that investors may be bet­ter served to remem­ber that the ECRI is pre­dict­ing the econ­omy, and not the stock mar­ket. These two are highly cor­re­lated, but cer­tainly do not always move in the same direc­tion together, except per­haps when you take the 2nd dif­fer­en­tial into con­sid­er­a­tion.  The 2nd dif­fer­en­tial is another way of say­ing, “less bad” data.  Less bad data (aka Green Shoots) is arguably what started the rally off the bot­tom in March 2009.

 

If you look at the chart above, the trends are fairly clear.   It’s not the absolute level of the data being pos­i­tive or neg­a­tive, it’s the trend of the num­bers.   The mar­ket is not as for­ward think­ing as most investors believe.   It moves up on data that is ‘less bad’ or bet­ter than it was pre­vi­ously, and moves down on ‘more bad’ or worse than the prior data before.

So it seems to us that the weekly  ECRI data series should be viewed dif­fer­ently when think­ing about the econ­omy ver­sus the stock mar­ket.  The absolute num­bers accu­rately reflect the over­all econ­omy, and the 2nd dif­fer­en­tial is a bet­ter reflec­tion of the direc­tion of the stock market.

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Markets | Comments Off


ECRI: Why Our Recession Call Stands

Friday, March 16th, 2012

Why Our Reces­sion Call Stands

by Lak­sh­man Achuthan and Anir­van Banerji, ECRI

Many have ques­tioned why, in the face of improv­ing eco­nomic data, ECRI has main­tained its reces­sion call. The straight answer is that the objec­tive eco­nomic indi­ca­tors we mon­i­tor, includ­ing those we make pub­lic, give us no other choice.

Let’s start with the cur­rent state of the econ­omy. A cou­ple of weeks ago, we pub­licly high­lighted ECRI’s U.S. Coin­ci­dent Index (USCI). It’s impor­tant to under­stand that the USCI isn’t a ran­dom con­coc­tion of data, but rather the gold stan­dard for mea­sur­ing cur­rent eco­nomic growth, as it sum­ma­rizes the key coin­ci­dent eco­nomic indi­ca­tors used to deter­mine the offi­cial start and end dates of U.S. reces­sions; namely, the broad mea­sures of out­put, employ­ment, income and sales. So when USCI growth is in a down­turn (bot­tom line in chart), it’s an author­i­ta­tive indi­ca­tion that over­all U.S. eco­nomic growth is actu­ally wors­en­ing, not reviving.

In con­trast to the 3% GDP growth widely reported for the lat­est quar­ter, year-over-year growth in GDP, after peak­ing at 3½% in Q3/2010, has basi­cally flat­lined around 1½% for the last three quar­ters. Broad sales growth has fol­lowed a sim­i­lar pat­tern, while the growth rates of per­sonal income and indus­trial pro­duc­tion have dropped to their low­est read­ings since the spring of 2010.

The excep­tion to this weak­en­ing pat­tern is year-over-year pay­roll job growth, which con­tin­ued to improve through Jan­u­ary, and was essen­tially flat in Feb­ru­ary. How­ever, the empir­i­cal record shows that job growth typ­i­cally turns down after down­turns in con­sumer spend­ing growth, not the other way around. Because con­sumer spend­ing growth remains in a cycli­cal down­turn, we expect job growth to start flag­ging in the com­ing months.  But the point remains that the USCI, which sum­ma­rizes the defin­i­tive coin­ci­dent eco­nomic indi­ca­tors – includ­ing jobs – indi­cates declin­ing growth in the U.S. economy.

How about forward-looking indi­ca­tors? We find that year-over-year growth in ECRI’s Weekly Lead­ing Index (WLI) remains in a cycli­cal down­turn (top line in chart) and, as of early March, is near its worst read­ing since July 2009. Close observers of this index might be under­stand­ably sur­prised by this per­sis­tent weak­ness, since the WLI’s smoothed annu­al­ized growth rate, which is much bet­ter known, has turned decid­edly less neg­a­tive in recent months. The unusual diver­gence between these two mea­sures of growth under­scores a wide­spread sea­sonal adjust­ment prob­lem that econ­o­mists have known about for some time.

Most data, both pub­lic and pri­vate, are sea­son­ally adjusted. But the nature of the Great Reces­sion seems to have had an unex­pected impact on the sta­tis­ti­cal sea­sonal adjust­ment algo­rithms that are hard-wired to detect when the sea­sonal pat­terns evolve and change over the years. This is nor­mally a good thing, but when the econ­omy fell off a cliff in Q4/2008 and Q1/2009, it was partly inter­preted by these pro­ce­dures as a last­ing change in sea­sonal pat­terns. So, accord­ing to these pro­grams, data from Q4 and Q1 would be expected there­after to be rel­a­tively weak, and there­fore auto­mat­i­cally adjusted upwards. Our due dili­gence on this sub­ject indi­cates a wide­spread prob­lem, result­ing in many recent eco­nomic head­lines being skewed to the upside.

How­ever, we have no way to objec­tively mea­sure the extent of these prob­lems – either the upward bias for Q4 and Q1 or the down­ward bias for Q2 and Q3. For­tu­nately, year-over-year growth rates are nat­u­rally less sus­cep­ti­ble to these sea­sonal issues because they involve com­par­isons to the same period a year ear­lier that is likely to be skewed the same way. In con­trast, smoothed annu­al­ized growth rates, which we have tra­di­tion­ally pre­ferred, pre­sume proper sea­sonal adjust­ment. While the extent of the sea­sonal prob­lem will be debated, mon­i­tor­ing year-over-year growth rates is a mat­ter of sim­ple pru­dence at this junc­ture not only for ECRI’s indexes but also for other eco­nomic data.

In the chart, please note the one-to-one cor­re­spon­dence between the cycli­cal swings in the year-over-year growth rates of the WLI and USCI since the Great Reces­sion. Both surged ini­tially, only to roll over, pop up briefly, and then turn down once again. It is notable that the WLI, which is sen­si­tive to the prices of risk assets that have been sup­ported by mas­sive world­wide liq­uid­ity injec­tions, has hardly been swayed from its reces­sion­ary tra­jec­tory. In spite of the efforts of mon­e­tary pol­icy mak­ers, actual U.S. eco­nomic growth has slowed, while WLI growth has barely budged from a two-and-a-half-year low.

The big­ger ques­tion is, can unprece­dented, con­certed global mon­e­tary pol­icy action repeal the busi­ness cycle? The objec­tive coin­ci­dent and lead­ing indexes that we have always mon­i­tored are still telling us that it cannot.

Click here to down­load an Excel file with the chart data.

 

Copy­right © ECRI

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Markets | Comments Off


Another Country in Europe to Avoid (Koesterich)

Tuesday, March 13th, 2012

While Greece is now cleared to receive a sec­ond bailout and Spain and Italy are fac­ing lower bor­row­ing costs, Europe is not yet out of the woods. Greece, for instance, still has unsus­tain­ably high debt lev­els, and Portugal’s ris­ing yields are becom­ing increas­ingly wor­ri­some.

Given these lin­ger­ing issues, I recently advo­cated that investors avoid Spain and Italy, mar­kets that are cheap for a rea­son. Now, I’m adding another coun­try to the list of Euro­pean mar­kets to con­sider under­weight­ing: the United King­dom, a mar­ket that has its own issues sep­a­rate from those of the euro zone.

Cur­rently, equi­ties in the United King­dom appear over­val­ued, espe­cially when you con­sider the numer­ous signs that the coun­try is tee­ter­ing on the brink of another reces­sion. As of this writ­ing, UK stocks are trad­ing at a rel­a­tively rich val­u­a­tion of 1.7x book value, higher than the 1.5x book value aver­age for devel­oped countries.

At the same time, eco­nomic con­di­tions in the United King­dom are dete­ri­o­rat­ing. Expec­ta­tions for UK growth have decreased over the last six months, and UK cor­po­rate sec­tor prof­itabil­ity has dropped since the end of last year. In addi­tion, UK mort­gage rates have increased and unem­ploy­ment remains at a 17-year high, head­winds for an econ­omy where house­hold spend­ing accounts for roughly 2/3 of gross domes­tic product.

While UK infla­tion is declin­ing, it’s still ele­vated at 3.6%, a level well above both the Bank of England’s tar­get rate and UK wage growth. Thanks to the United Kingdom’s rel­a­tively high infla­tion, it appears unlikely that the Bank of Eng­land will pro­vide fur­ther quan­ti­ta­tive eas­ing in the near term, mean­ing the UK econ­omy will have less growth sup­port. Finally, the United King­dom may be try­ing to reign in its deficit too quickly by rais­ing taxes and cut­ting spend­ing, poten­tially rais­ing the risk of another recession.

So where should investors con­sider invest­ing in Europe? I con­tinue to believe that much of North­ern Europe rep­re­sents a good value for long-term investors and I par­tic­u­larly like Ger­many, the Nether­lands and Nor­way (poten­tial iShares solu­tions: NYSEARCA: EWG, NYSEARCA: EWN, NYSEAMEX: ENOR).

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Markets | Comments Off


What "Seasonal Adjustments" Actually Mean and Do For Data (Tchir)

Tuesday, March 13th, 2012

Via Peter Tchir of TF Mar­ket Advi­sors,

There has been a lot of talk lately about “sea­sonal adjust­ments” and what they actu­ally mean and do for the data.

Report­ing today’s fore­cast in “sea­son­ally adjusted” terms would not be incor­rect. The tem­per­a­ture today is almost 30 degrees higher than the aver­age March tem­per­a­ture in NYC, so report­ing it as 30 degrees higher than the annual tem­per­a­ture is fine. You instantly know that today is abnor­mally warm for the time of year. It doesn’t nec­es­sar­ily help you choose what to wear unless you know the monthly and annual aver­ages. It isn’t wrong, but the infor­ma­tion isn’t per­fect either. If you only had national aver­age tem­per­a­tures, how would you sea­son­ally adjust today’s NYC tem­per­a­ture? That gets more complicated.

We like “sea­son­ally” adjusted num­bers because it “smooths” the data. We don’t get big jumps due to the time of year and we can apply trend lines, etc. to the graphs. There is noth­ing wrong per se with that, but the adjust­ments can also mask things in the data. On unem­ploy­ment, is the BLS adjust­ment bet­ter or worse than what other peo­ple model? What vari­ables does it account for? Does it prop­erly account for poten­tial effects of how long a reces­sion has been going. How often does “sea­son­al­ity” change. In the­ory, the mar­ket could see a –200k num­ber and real­ize that if nor­mally this time of year it would have been –400k, then it is a good num­ber. It would be a good sign, but it is only +200k for exam­ple if the sea­son­al­ity is con­sis­tent. Any­ways, enough on that sub­ject. Sea­son­al­ity isn’t bad, and is use­ful in many ways, but so is the raw data and try­ing to fig­ure out if the adjust­ments make sense or need to be mod­i­fied a lot due to the par­tic­u­lar cir­cum­stances at the time (like great warm weather).

The mar­kets are almost all doing well so far this morn­ing. Cor­po­rate and finan­cial credit in Europe is sig­nif­i­cantly tighter, with Main 3 tighter, XOVER 11 tighter, and the Finan­cials CDS index 4 tighter. Partly on the back of some Ger­man con­fi­dence num­bers (which don’t seem to be a lead­ing indi­ca­tor) and hopes that the EU is becom­ing less aus­tere. Spain has been told to get to a 5.3% bud­get deficit, rather than the 4.4% one they reneged on last week. Both sides are main­tain­ing the farce that the 3% tar­get for 2013 will be met.

Span­ish bond yields are higher again, and CDS is unchanged – about the only asset that doesn’t seem to be doing bet­ter today. Accord­ing to Bloomberg, the EFSF will be releas­ing money to Greece, €5.9 bil­lion in March, €3.3 bil­lion in April, and €5.3 bil­lion in May. That is good, because the ECB has €4.7 bil­lion of GGB bonds matur­ing in March, and €3.3 bil­lion of GGB bonds matur­ing in May.

After a flurry of early num­bers, we can all wait for the Fed state­ment. If there was ever a day designed to be wait­ing for the Fed state­ment sit­ting out­side at Bryant Park or some­where, today would be that day. But inside, star­ing at screens, the mar­ket will be closely watch­ing the state­ment. There is some con­cern the Fed may acknowl­edge that infla­tion is actu­ally a con­cern for the first time, reduc­ing chances of fur­ther QE. As the elec­tion gets closer, it will become harder for the Fed to move on QE with­out com­pellingly bad data (not just bad in the eyes of the Fed, but to gen­eral per­son track­ing the econ­omy). There is still hope that the Fed has been down­play­ing growth in order to jus­tify QE and will sig­nal its inten­tions to move before it is too late, and the bank stress tests may be another rea­son the Fed can jus­tify QE, espe­cially in the mort­gage mar­ket, where the Fed insisted on sce­nar­ios worse than most investors expected.

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
Posted in Markets | Comments Off